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Product firms are gradually adopting service business models
(Cusumano, Kahl, & Suarez, 2015). Approximately two thirds of product
firms in developed countries have already adopted a servitization strat-
egy (Neely, 2008). In addition, on average service revenue of product
firms accounts for 30% of their total revenue (Fang, Palmatier, &
Steenkamp, 2008). Through servitization, firms are able to differentiate
their offering and enhance customer engagement (Vandermerwe &
Rada, 1988). Nevertheless, recent studies have shown that capturing
value through servitization is complex in firms selling manufactured
(Benedetti, Neely, & Swink, 2015; Kohtamäki, Partanen, Parida, &
Wincent, 2013) and digitalized products (Suarez, Cusumano, & Kahl,
2013). This article seeks to unpack some of the complexities of
servitization by examining the role of digital technologies and firm
interdependencies, two underexplored elements in servitization
literature.
Through digital technologies product firms are able to adopt, design
and deliver new smart and connected products that change the way
they compete (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014), and provide servicesdrell-Herrero).
nc. This is an open access article und
F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
marman.2016.06.013(Porter & Heppelmann, 2015). The dematerialisation of physical prod-
ucts is merging the trends in digitization and servitization of the offer
in product firms (Lerch & Gotsch, 2015). An incipient but growing liter-
ature is analysing the role of digital technologies in servitized product
firms under the heading digital servitization (Vendrell-Herrero &
Wilson, 2016), which is formally described as the provision of digital
services embedded in a physical product (Holmström & Partanen,
2014). This stream of literature examines how digital technologies are
both a driver and enabler of servitization. In terms of establishingmech-
anisms of value capture, digital servitization introduces two important
obstacles. First, digital services often substitute (or cannibalize) tradi-
tional products (Greenstein, 2010), which is challenging in terms of
business model implementation (Cusumano et al., 2015). Second,
once digital services are created the marginal cost of producing new
units is practically zero, which reduces the customers' perception of
the value created by the offering (Rifkin, 2014). An important contribu-
tion of this study is an analysis of howproductfirms can overcome these
obstacles.
Digital disruption in combination with electronic commerce has af-
fected firm interdependencies and power relationships in a number of
different sectors. In themusic, taxi and hotel sectors newdigital services
such as Spotify, Uber and AirBnB have entered the market as down-
stream retailers and have established competitive offerings byer the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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dependent suppliers. There are examples of upstream firms havingmain-
tained a dominant position in the supply chain. For example in the travel
industryAirlines have been able to create reliable digital service platforms
for retail and retain control over production, service provision and infra-
structure operation despite many new digital intermediaries entering
the market (Preiss & Murray, 2005). The present article examines how
the appearance and growth of digital retailers impacts on the power re-
lationships in the entire supply chain (Cox, 1999). Literature analysing
the role of electronic retailers in supply chains has implicitly or explicitly
explored the unidirectional dependence of upstream or downstream
parties. Analysis of the music industry shows that music producers
have increased their dependence on digital retailers (Bustinza, Parry, &
Vendrell-Herrero, 2013). Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann (2014) analyse
digital servitization in book sales and find that Amazon uses its scale to
dominate the relationship with its suppliers and competitors. These pa-
pers examine a particular context from only one perspective and to the
best of our knowledge, literature is silent on the analysis of bidirectional,
upstream–downstream interdependencies in those contexts. Conse-
quently, a second important contribution of the present research is the
analysis of the dynamics of upstream–downstream interdependencies
in sectors where digital servitization has occurred.
The book publishing industry is a suitable context for study for a
number of reasons. First, product firms in this industry have
experimented with digital servitization through the development of
digital products, eBooks, and the launch of specific hardware, eReaders
(Anand, Olson, & Tripsas, 2009; Gilbert, 2015). Second, the industry has
receivedwidespread coverage in the popular press due to disagreements
over product pricing between upstream organizations (publishers) and
downstream electronic retailers (Baye, De los Santos, & Wildenbeest,
2013). Third, we argue that there is a difference in the market prices
sought between a product firm and an electronic retailer as they control,
and therefore seek to monetize, different resources. All these factors are
features of the publishing industry and underpin the research design
based on the comparison between publishers' desired prices and actual
market prices of digital services. Therefore, a third important contribu-
tion of this study is the method implemented that robustly estimates a
product firms' preferred prices. Previous studies analysing the pricing
disagreement between productfirms and electronic retailers in the pub-
lishing industry have used parametric (De los Santos & Wildenbeest,
2015; Reimers & Waldfogel, 2014) or game-theoretic approaches
(Gaudin &White, 2014; Li, Lin, Xu, & Swain, 2015). The empirical analy-
sis in this paper exploits survey data for 8000 consumers residing in the
UK and USA and elicits the consumers' willingness to pay specific prices
using the payment card method (Camacho-Cuenca, García-Gallego,
Georgantzís, & Sabater-Grande, 2004; Ryan &Watson, 2009). This exer-
cise informs firms' decision-making and can be used to estimate the
price that maximises publishers' profit.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the theo-
retical underpinning, positioning the paper as a study that examines
howdigital servitization affects the vertical interdependencies in supply
chains. Insights allow the development of two testable theoretical prop-
ositions. Section 3 builds upon the particular case of the publishing in-
dustry and presents arguments as to why this is a suitable context to
test theoretical propositions. Section 4 explains the data gathering pro-
cess, describes methodology, and shows results. Section 5 presents a
discussion of the results in relation to the current debates in the publish-
ing industry. Section 6 closes the work with relevant theoretical and
managerial implications and future research.
2. Theoretical underpinning
2.1. Structure of power in upstream–downstream relationships
Supply chain management (SCM) encompasses the efforts involved
in delivering and producing products and services in the value chainPlease cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.013(Sherer, 2005). SCM links the processes across supplier–user companies
and functions that enable the value chain tomake products and provide
services to the customer (Cox, Blackstone, & Spencer, 1995). The para-
digm moves beyond the individual organization to a broader perspec-
tive examining the value-creating network formed by the key firms
(Kothandaraman & Wilson, 2001). Firms work together in supply
chains, but seek to maximize their individual power to capture greater
value for themselves (Peppard & Rylander, 2006). The linkages between
the systems of interdependent activities that compose a product's sup-
ply chain create the structures of power and therefore the resolution of
the trade-offs created within these linkages provides a source of firm
competitive advantage (Porter, 1985).
The research presented here builds upon theory of organizational
power within the supply chain and follows Cox (1999), who describes
power as an unbalanced relationship in which either upstream or
downstream parties in the supply chain have the capacity to appropri-
atemost of the value createdwithin exchanges. Power can be examined
from a single perspective, studying the dependence of the focal or part-
ner company, where dependence is the unidirectional reliance of a
party on its counterpart (Scheer, Miao, & Palmatier, 2014). Dependence
plays a critical role in industrial marketing relationships and impacts on
strategic behaviour and economic outcomes with widely divergent
results (Lusch & Brown, 1996). An alternative and more integrative ap-
proach looks at power from a bidirectional perspective (Kumar, Scheer,
& Steenkamp, 1995), studying the magnitude of interdependence be-
tween parties (e.g. level of dependency of the focal and partner parties)
and the dyadic structure of power in terms of interdependencies (e.g.
asymmetric or symmetric interdependencies). In a meta-analysis of
the literature on interdependencies, Scheer et al. (2014) conclude that
the impact of Business-to-Business (B2B) interdependencies differs
from those of Business-to-Consumer (B2C) and product-based ex-
change relationships differ from service-based relationships.
Asymmetries of power in the supply chain can result from a firm
havingmarket dominance in terms of size andmarket share. In addition
other strategic factors influence power imbalances between upstream
and downstream companies. For instance, Palmer, Simmons,
Robinson, and Fearne (2015) describe how downstream suppliers can
produce power imbalances through institutionalizing industrial work-
shops, a venue basedmechanismwhere thedominant partner enhances
their standing in B2B exchanges by enacting presentations, discussions
and award ceremonies. The approach ensures that institutional logics
of a dominant buyer are persistent in the face of any potential supplier
disruption and supplier dependence is increased through the genera-
tion of collective identities and the enhancement of supplier docility.
Another way of exercising power is to increase switching costs through
the enforcement of specific technology adoption. Hart and Saunders
(1997) provide an example of the implementation of firm specific Elec-
tronic Data Interchange (EDI) technology. Non-dominant firms had to
change to the powerful firms chosen technology if theywish to do busi-
ness with them, locking them into the relationship by increasing their
switching cost and making them technologically dependent.
The fact that an organization has power over another does not imply
that power is exercised. The existence of power is not necessarily
incompatible with trust and cooperation between upstream and down-
streamparties (Kumar, 2005). He, Ghobadian, andGallear (2013) found
that in long-term relationships the dominant company holding the bal-
ance of power could enhance knowledge acquisition processes and im-
prove the performance of the supply chain by restraining from the use
of their power.
The reviewed literature on power in supply chains is illustrated in
Table 1 in a representation of power structure and perspective. On the
horizontal axis, supplier–buyer interactions are analysed as unidirec-
tional (i.e. the context is analysed from the perspective of the focal com-
pany only) or bidirectional (i.e. the context is analysed from the
perspective of both focal and partner companies). On the vertical axis,
power relationships can be balanced or unbalanced.tion and supply chain interdependency, Industrial Marketing Manage-
Table 1
What are interdependences and the risks of asymmetric interdependences?
Source: Author elaboration.
Supply chain focus
Unidirectional Bidirectional
Dyadic structure
of power
Balanced Quadrant I
No switching costs — perfect competition.
See for example:
Bell, Auh, S., and Smalley (2005), Cannon, Doney, Mullen, and Petersen
(2010), and Suarez et al. (2013)
Quadrant III
Symmetric
interdependence.
See for example:
Celly and Frazier (1996), Kumar et al. (1995), Lusch and Brown
(1996), and Morgan and Hunt (1994)
Unbalanced Quadrant II
Focal or partner dependence.
See for example:
Eggert and Ulaga (2010), Ferguson, Paulin, and Bergeron (2005),
Opresnik and Taisch (2015), Palmer et al. (2015), Parry et al. (2012),
and Ritala et al. (2014).
Quadrant IV
Asymmetric interdependence.
See for example:
Gulati and Sytch (2007), Hart and Saunders (1997), Kim (2002), and
Kumar et al. (1995, 1998).
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markets inwhichnumerous buyers and suppliers operate. In thosemar-
kets there are no vertical dependencies because there are either no
switching costs or they are very low. Quadrants II and IV represent
those markets in which upstream or downstream organizations can
exert some power over the other parties in the supply chain. The differ-
ence between those quadrants resides in the unit of analysis. Whilst
studies in Quadrant II analyse the power imbalances from one perspec-
tive, either the dependent party or the one exercising the power, Quad-
rant IV analyses imbalances from two perspectives, such that both
parties may be dependent on each other, but this dependency is asym-
metric. Studies in Quadrant IV examine actions and reactions and take a
broader perspective than Quadrant II, creating greater understanding of
the dynamics of power in supply chains. Finally, studies in Quadrant III
similarly to Quadrant IV analyse supply chains inwhich buyer and seller
are dependent on each other, but in the case of Quadrant III the parties
are equally dependent.
2.2. Digital servitization disruption
Servitization refers to the process where firms set out to create
greater value by increasing the services they offer (Vandermerwe &
Rada, 1988). The focus of academic literature has been on product
firms from different industry sectors that have developed services to
add value, revenue and profit, to their particular business operations
(Baines & Lightfoot, 2013; Cusumano et al., 2015; Neely, 2008). At a
theoretical level the addition of services in product firms seems to be
an important element in enhancing the value of a products' technical
performance and securing a competitive position in a supply chain
(Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008; Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988). In
addition, the process of servitization develops the firm's innovative ca-
pabilities, creating value at the consumer level by offering a balance of
products and services (Visnjic & Van Looy, 2013). Nevertheless, recent
empirical studies indicate that the addition of services is not a guarantee
of increased firm performance (Benedetti et al., 2015; Kohtamäki et al.,
2013; Kowalkowski, Windahl, Kindström, & Gebauer, 2015; Suarez et
al., 2013). There are different factors such as product lifecycle and the
threat of entry of new competitors that influence the capacity to capture
value from service implementation (Cusumano et al., 2015). The addi-
tion of services in productfirms often requires a period of organizational
transformation and if the firm is under stable market conditions the
process of value capture can remain invariant (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor,
2007).
The process of value capture can change when disruptive shocks
arise (Christensen, 1997) and digital technology disrupts the way prod-
uct firms compete and offer services (Lerch & Gotsch, 2015; Porter &
Heppelmann, 2014, 2015; Vendrell-Herrero & Wilson, 2016). Digital
technologies are changing employment relations and increasing firm
productivity, but may also bring higher unemployment (BrynjolfssonPlease cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.013& McAfee, 2011). Business models reflect consumer's requirement,
how value is delivered, consumer lock-in, processes of value capture
and profit generation (Teece, 2010). Chesbrough and Rosenbloom
(2002) state that the implementation of new business models unlocks
latent value fromexisting technology, linking technical potential and re-
alization of economic value. The digital transformation of business
models is re-shaping consumer preferences and consumption as indus-
tries are introducing digital technologies to enhance their competitive-
ness in order to change customer relationships (Dellarocas, 2003),
internal processes (BarNir, Gallaugher, & Auger, 2003) and value prop-
ositions (Lusch, Vargo, & Tanniru, 2010). ‘Digitization’ is becoming
“the new norm” (Hinssen, 2010).
Are digitization and servitization the same or at least similar con-
structs?Whilst it is possible to move towards service without digitizing
the offer, and it is possible to digitize an offerwithout offering it as a ser-
vice, the interaction between digitization and servitization is considered
very strong (Gago & Rubalcaba, 2007; Lerch&Gotsch, 2015). Kindström
and Kowalkowski (2014) find that digitization facilitates the develop-
ment of cost-efficient operations and is an enabler of service quality
through better resource allocation and more accurate information
sharing inside and outside the boundaries of the firm. The provision of
digital services has become a sub-stream of service business model cre-
ation or servitization (Baird & Raghu, 2015) and has enhanced the func-
tioning of servitized supply chains (Holmström & Partanen, 2014). This
sub-stream of research, described recently as ‘Digital Servitization’
(Vendrell-Herrero & Wilson, 2016), is defined as the provision of IT-
enabled (i.e. digital) services relying on digital components embedded
in physical products (Holmström & Partanen, 2014; Schroeder &
Kotlarsky, 2015).
The field of digital servitization is differentiated from mainstream
servitization in three aspects. First, the marginal cost of digital services
is near zero (Rifkin, 2014). Second, whilst services are usually comple-
mentary to a product offering (Cusumano et al., 2015), digital services
are often substitutes for traditional products (Greenstein, 2010). Finally,
digital technologies, as with other disruptive technology, open new
business opportunities that can be executed by new entrants
(Christensen, 1997), especially hardware and software developers or
retailers.
An incipient body of empirical research has explored digital
servitization in specific contexts which include manufacturing
(Opresnik & Taisch, 2015), software companies (Suarez et al., 2013),
and the recorded music industry (Parry, Bustinza, & Vendrell-Herrero,
2012). These empirical papers can be linked to the theoretical frame-
work of firm interdependencies seen in Table 1. Suarez et al. (2013)
analyse service businessmodels of software companies from a unidirec-
tional perspective and assume that there are no switching costs be-
tween software suppliers and their clients, so are located in Quadrant I
of Table 1. Further to their discussion of servitization, both Parry et al.
(2012) and Opresnik and Taisch (2015) implicitly analyse powertion and supply chain interdependency, Industrial Marketing Manage-
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troduction of digital technology into their business model (Quadrant II
of Table 1). The work presented here builds on this past research and
identifies a gap in the literature as no empirical papers have been
found which address digital servitization and supply chain power dy-
namics corresponding to Quadrants III and IV of Table 1.2.3. Digital servitization and firm interdependencies
Digital servitization can offer opportunities to downstream compa-
nies to improve their position in the supply chain. Wise and
Baumgartner (1999) show that there are economic and environmental
rationales forfirms to go downstreamand capture value fromadditional
services. Further to this, Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) find that down-
stream firms can achieve a dominant position in a supply chain through
the improvement of communication with customers and other
organizations.
Supplier linkages are essential determinants of supply chain perfor-
mance and value generation (Lee, Kwon, & Severance, 2007). Link chan-
nels are the point of interaction between clients and a firm's front office,
and as the site of supplier relationships act as enablers of interactions
where value is co-created, and actions are accessible to both parties
(Bustinza et al., 2013). The study of link channels enables greater under-
standing of consumer needs as they are an important element in creat-
ing and capturing value (Lepak et al., 2007; Yoo & Lee, 2011). Firms
controlling access to consumers have bargaining power in supply chains
and hence link channels are a focus of power and a source of disputes
between upstreamand downstreamfirms (Porter &Heppelman, 2014).
A move downstream towards the final customer in a supply chain
yields opportunities for organizations, enabling them to draw upon in-
creased volumes of consumer data and use increasingly sophisticated
methods to analyse such data (Neely, 2008; Bell, 2015). Such action po-
tentially also empowers consumers in B2C relations (Bustinza et al.,
2013) and downstream organizations in B2B relations (Wise &
Baumgartner, 1999). Therefore, disruption caused by digital
servitization might have substantial impact on the upstream–down-
stream power structure. The process of downstream empowerment
generates asymmetric interdependencies in processes of digital
servitization.
Proposition 1. Digital servitization increases the relative dependence
of upstream firms on downstream companies.
Digital technology is an engine for service innovation (Carlborg,
Kindström, & Kowalkowski, 2014; Gago & Rubalcaba, 2007), and there-
fore it enables upstream organizations to move from gaining value
through traditional product-centric business models to creating greater
value from service offerings (Holmström&Partanen, 2014). The process
of value creation and capture are often separate, but connected products
allow firms to rethink how value is created and captured, and how they
could capture data and evolve the business models with traditional or
new partners (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014; Parry, Brax, Maull, & Ng,
2016).
Digital service provision by upstream firms may enhance value cre-
ation processes but they also need to develop specific strategies (Kumar,
Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1998) to enhance their bargaining power or their
gains may be appropriated by downstream firms (Coff, 1999; Lepak et
al., 2007). Strategies must compensate for the potential impact and re-
establish symmetric interdependencies, moving firms from Quadrant
IV to Quadrant III in Table 1. These bidirectional relationships have not
been explored in the context of digital servitization.
According to Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998), upstream companies can
rebalance interdependencies by regaining control in the linkages and
communication channels with customers. The identification, manage-
ment and deployment of unique resources has been identified as an es-
sential factor to increase firm competitive advantage (Sirmon & Hitt,Please cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.0132003), networks (Keil, Maula, & Wilson, 2010), and market positioning
(Costa, Cool, & Dierickx, 2013; Finne, Turunen, & Eloranta, 2015) and
hence improve value capture mechanisms. Unique resources can take
different forms such as patents, intellectual property rights or copy-
rights, tacit knowledge, organization culture and flexibility, etc. Product
firms adding digital services to their offer must learn how to leverage
their unique resources in order to rebalance their position of power in
respect of downstream firms (Ulaga & Reinhart, 2011). We argue that
the deployment of such unique resources provide opportunities for
upstream firms to reshape the competitive landscape because they im-
prove negotiation power and can give the provider access to the linkage
with customers. Following this argumentation we contend that for
product firms offering digital services bargaining power enhancement
is achieved through the control and deployment of unique resources.
Proposition 2. Unique resources allow upstream companies to reduce
relative dependence on downstream companies.3. The context of the study: the publishing industry
There are several reasons that justify the selection of the book
publishing industry as the empirical context for this study. First, the
publishing industry continues to face digital servitization disruption.
Similar to other creative and entertainment industries, the book indus-
try business model changed from selling content in only tangible phys-
ical format, hardback and softback books, to offering content in both
physical and digital forms (Baye et al., 2013). The eBook is themain dig-
ital offer in the publishing industry (Gilbert, 2015). It has a digital com-
ponent (i.e. files), which are embedded in physical hardware during
use, and therefore it complies with definitions of digital servitization
(Shroeder & Kotlarsky, 2015; Holmström & Partanen, 2014). According
to Greenstein (2010), a difficulty in assessing the value created by the
digital servitization of a product arises as the new offering may partly
cannibalize the existing offering. In the case of the publishing industry
the effect of cannibalization is straightforward to access given that the
new offer creates little if any new demand and any additional financial
value realised is due to the consumer's increased valuation of the new
offer over the old.
Second, the publishing industry has Business-to-Business (B2B) in-
terdependencies between upstream (i.e. publishers) and downstream
(i.e. retailers) firms. Industry firms have a large proportion of their
personnel in boundary spanning roles, upstream to contract for and
supervise production of books, and downstream to achieve optimal dis-
tribution, promote and market the products. The individuals in the
boundary roles monitor the environment, providing information to
the firm, which helps develop strategy to fit the organizations position
within an uncertain environment (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Ferguson,
Paulin, & Bergeron, 2005).
The market structure changed dramatically with digital
servitization, producing power imbalances in the publishing industry
(Gilbert, 2015). In the 1990s the first electronic retailers, e-retailers, en-
tered themarket selling only physical books via online stores.More than
30 e-retailers appeared in the US including Wordsworth, Powells and
Amazon (Clay, Krishnan, & Wolff, 2001, p. 532). Following innovation
in file formats and after 2007 when dedicated hardware was launched,
eBook sales generated significant growth in sales volumes (Anand et al.,
2009).
Third, and importantly, thedynamics of power imbalances can bedi-
rectly observed with the analysis of a single variable: the price. Recent
studies have provided theoretical models in which price determination
is the main factor of disagreement between publishers and retailers
(Gaudin & White, 2014; Hua, Cheng, & Wuang, 2011; Li et al., 2015).
At a theoretical level there are two main models employed in the
publishing industry to set the final price for consumers — see Gilbert
(2015) for more details. The first is the wholesale model where ation and supply chain interdependency, Industrial Marketing Manage-
Fig. 1. Publishers' revenue evolution.
Source: UK information only contains sales of books in physical
form and is collected by Nielsen Bookscan, US information
contains data for the aggregated sales (physical and digital) for
5 of the big six publishers. This information comes from the
association of American Publishers.
Table 2
Market share of Amazon's kindle and Amazon's store.
Hardware (% ownership) US UK
Kindle 19.6% 27.6%
Kindle as the only hardware to read eBooks 8.9% 12.3%
iPad 15.9% 19.0%
iPad as the only hardware to read eBooks 8.0% 7.7%
Android tablet 17.4% 19.8%
Android tablet as the only hardware to read eBooks 8.5% 8.4%
Online store (% at least one purchase) US UK
Amazon.com 36.1% 54%
iBookstore 4.3% 3.4%
Google books 3% 2.7%
eBay 5.9% 15%
Barnes & Noble 7.8% –
5F. Vendrell-Herrero et al. / Industrial Marketing Management xxx (2016) xxx–xxxproducer receives the designated wholesale price for each unit of the
product and the retailer sets the retail or market price, which deter-
mines total industry revenues. In the second model, described as an
agent model, the publisher sets the market price and the retailer sells
the product as its agent, getting a portion of the market price.
The structure of retailing produces disagreement in pricing strategies
between publishers and retailers due to the different economic interests
of the actors. The six largest publishers in the US, accounting for 90% of
the eBook market, have sought to enhance the market value of eBooks,
and have been described as an oligopoly (Baye et al., 2013). Those firms
have traditionally behaved as profit maximizers, and they have been ac-
cused of colluding to increase prices (De los Santos &Wildenbeest, 2015;
Reimers & Waldfogel, 2014). The model is under threat as digital
servitization disruption has reduced the capacity offirms to set horizontal
or vertical barriers and control markets (Bradley et al., 2015). Therefore
the profitability of publishers (Myrthianos, Vendrell-Herrero, Bustinza,
& Parry, 2014) and artists (Byrne, 2012) is decreasing, or at least stagnat-
ing. Comparative annual data is difficult to gather but Fig. 1 provides reli-
able figures for the evolution of publishers' revenues from 2006 to 2013
in UK and US. The data provided shows that publishers' revenues have
remained constant during this period.
On the retail side, one single company, Amazon, currently dominates
the market, holding significant market power and a monopsony posi-
tion (Ritala et al., 2014). Amazon's estimated US market share is now
60% eBooks and 30% physical books.1 The other 40% of the market of
eBooks is divided amongst a range of companies including Apple,
Barnes & Noble, Google, Asda and others. In 2013 we engaged in a part-
nershipwith one of the five global leading publishing companies as part
of a project to understand how consumers value digital goods and the
likely changes facing the supply network. The industry project partner
conducted a survey of 8000 consumers, half of them residing in US
and the other half in UK. The survey contained questions regarding
eReader ownership and the online stores in which consumers have
made a purchase. With this information analysis was undertaken of
Amazon's leadership as a retailer in the publishing industry. Table 2 re-
ports mean values for eReader device ownership and purchasing in on-
line stores. In terms of eReaders Amazon has a slightly larger market
share; 19.6% of UShouseholds and 27.6% of UKhouseholds own theAm-
azon Kindle eReader device. Amazon Kindle's main competitors are the
iPad from Apple and android tablets. Their market share ranges be-
tween 15% and 20%. The market power of Amazon is more evident
through its online store. Results show that 54% of UK consumers and
36% of US consumers have purchased at least one item from Amazon's
online store. The iBookstore of Apple is significantly behind with only
3–4% of consumers purchasing from it. The remaining e-retailers have
significantly lower market shares.
Amazon has employed an unusual pricing strategy which is to in-
crease their installed base of consumers and revenues, but not necessar-
ily their profit (Reimers & Waldfogel, 2014). To visualize this strategy,
Fig. 2 provides detailed information about the evolution of revenues,
profit margin and share price of Amazon.com Inc. from 2000 to 2013.
This information shows the results of the whole organization and was
collected from Amazon's annual reports and Nasdaq. Fig. 2a shows
that whilst revenues have grown exponentially, profit margin was neg-
ative until 2003 and close to zero from then on. Additionally, Fig. 2b
shows that the market perceives revenue as the key metric of worth
since the price of Amazon's shares is strongly correlated with revenue,
and practically uncorrelated to profit. Consistent with this evidence, in
the present research Amazon is considered as a revenue-maximizing
firm at least for the period the data for the present study was collected
and therefore has a different pricing strategy to publisherswhoare prof-
it maximizers (Gilbert, 2015). According to standard economic1 Source Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab87b634-e5ad-11e3-aeef-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz34mua7vxp Last accessed June 16th, 2014.
Please cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.013modelling with reasonable assumptions of downward sloping demand
curves and positive costs (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer,
2000), the optimal price of a profit maximizing company is larger than
the optimal price of a revenue maximizing company who pursue an in-
crease of the quantity sold, lowering price and average profit margin
(Williamson, 1966).
The evolution of the publishing industry provides further support for
this fundamental point of price disagreement between publishers and
Amazon — see Baye et al. (2013) or Gilbert (2015) for more detail. The
launch of the iPad from Apple in January 2010 gave the publishers a
new platform through which they could reach their consumers and a
number of leading publishers signed a contract with Apple to sell their
content in the iBookstore using the agent model. The agreement was
different to previous wholesale model contracts signed with Amazon
or other retailers. Applewas the agent and sold the eBooks at themarket
price decided by the publishers, obtaining 30% commission of the stipu-
lated market price. With this agreement in place the publishers re-
contracted with their other retailers resulting in an increase of the
price for consumers. Amazon was pressurised to accept the new condi-
tions and signed agent contracts with the publishers. However, Amazon
was unhappy with this situation and took Apple and the other pub-
lishers to the US anti-trust court. Amazon's argument focused on the re-
duction in consumer surplus produced by the increase in price, which
Amazon argued was a direct result of implicit collusion between the
publishers and Apple. Amazon won the case in 2013, which producedAsda.com – 6.2%
Audible.com 2.9% 2.9%
AbeBooks.com 2.4% 4.2%
Alibris.com 1.9% 2.3%
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Fig. 2. Summary of results of Amazon from 2000 to 2013. a. Revenues and profit margin
evolution. b. Revenues and share price evolution.
Source: Own elaborated based on data obtained from Amazon's annual reports and
Nasdaq.
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and Wildenbeest (2015) conducted an event study to examine the
price shift in the bookmarket whenwholesale agreementwas enforced
in the US. They found that on average book prices were down by 18%
when retailers recovered the capacity to decide a book's prices through
wholesale agreements. This scenario evokes a situation where there are
no joint profit considerations. Reimers and Waldfogel (2014) collected
market information of hourly price changes of bestsellers in the years
2012 and 2013 and they estimate the price elasticity for eBooks sold
by Amazon. Their evidence suggests that eBooks are priced below the
static profit maximizing levels.
Finally, the publishing industry has another important characteristic
that develops the theoretical underpinning of thiswork. Publishers offer
two types of books: titles protected with exclusive copyrights, consid-
ered non-imitable resources (Miller & Shamsie, 1996), and titles with-
out those exclusive rights. In this regard the research is based on a
quasi-natural experiment, distinguishing between two forms of novels:
classic and modern. According to Heald (2014) the main difference be-
tween these forms of novels is who owns the copyrights: new releases
(e.g. Harry Potter) have exclusive copyrights and this provides the pub-
lisher with power to deploy and enforce unique resources, rebalancing
interdependencies with retailers; in contrast classic novels (e.g.
Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet) don't have exclusivity in their copy-
rights and hence the power imbalance between retailers and publishers
is towards retailers. Altogether, the elements discussed enable us toPlease cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.013consider the publishing industry as a suitable empirical context to test
our theoretical propositions.
4. Methodology, data and results
4.1. General description of the method
The aim of the present research is to examine upstream and down-
stream pricing strategies in the publishing industry, as prices reflect
power imbalances in the publishing supply chain. After a process of dig-
ital servitization the publishing industry has a new format, eBook, and a
dominant retailer, Amazon, who seeks to maximize revenues, and con-
sequently according to standard economic theory its optimal price
needs to be below the profit maximizing price of the producer
(Williamson, 1966). The analysis in this paper begins after the point a
reader has chosen the specific book that they wish to read. At this
point, the reader needs to make a decision on whether to purchase
the book in either physical or electronic format. Whilst the content in
both formats is exactly the same, readers might allocate different
value to formats offered on the basis of reasons such as the cult of tan-
gible ownership or the appreciation of the experience of visiting a book-
store (Ng & Smith, 2012). The relative price of the electronic version in
relation to the traditional physical version of the book is an important
determinant for the choice between these two varieties. The method
here acknowledges the existence of separate monopolies constructed
around each title, whilst the price of the traditional and electronic ver-
sion is one of the key determinants of the share of the two varieties of
each book in a closed market.
In this empirical context thefirst theoretical proposition of the paper
– digital servitization enhances downstream firms power – will be val-
idated if eBook market price is below publisher's profit maximizing
price point. In addition, the second theoretical proposition states that
publishers can regain power by deploying unique resources, in this con-
text exclusive copyright. The second theoretical proposition will be em-
pirically validated if, in addition to the validation of Proposition 1, there
is no significant difference between eBook market price and publisher's
profit maximizing price point for new releases over which the publisher
holds exclusive copyrights.
The test described requires four different steps; first, the identifica-
tion of average market prices for each eBook category of interest (i.e.
classic novels and new releases). For greater robustness the analysis is
performed in two large and relevant markets; the UK and US. Second,
the specification of a precise form of the demand function resulting
from the elicitation of an accurate pattern of product choice per relative
price interval, estimated using the payment card method via extensive
consumer surveys. The evidence provided comes from a consumer sur-
vey undertaken by a leading publisher with input from the researchers.
The third step is to construct a profit function and to know the price
point that maximises publisher's profits. The final step consists of a
comparison for each category and country of the difference between av-
erage market price and publishers' profit maximizing price.
4.2. Stage 1: the identification of average market prices
An estimated price has been calculated using average prices per
book category and country. Market price estimates are made using the
average retail price of thirty books sold, selecting the bestsellers on
www.amazon.com, in each category based upon prices in September
2013. Table 3 reports themarket price for the novel forms (New releases
and Classic) and countries (UK, US) considered in the analysis. Whilst
market prices for new releases and classic novels are practically the
same for eBooks (PE), classic novels are significantly more expensive
than new releases for physical books (PP). This evidence seems to indi-
cate that the discount for digital versions is larger in those forms of
novel without protected copyright.tion and supply chain interdependency, Industrial Marketing Manage-
2 For example in modern novels in the US we reject the null hypothesis that linear and
third degree (LR Chi2 (2) = 5.93, Prob N Chi = 0.0516) and second and third degree (LR
Chi2 (1) = 5.43, Prob N Chi2 = 0.0198) exhibit the same information at 5% level of signif-
icance. In other cases (Classic novels in US) we find the linear function is preferred. How-
ever, for homogeneity reasonswewill show only third degree functions in this article. The
profit maximizing points using the linear demand functions are quite close to those found
using third degree functions and are reported in this article. Linear demand functions are
available upon request, though an expert reader will be able to construct them herself
using the data available in Table 4.
3 The true difference in themargin contribution between an eBook and a Physical book
is subject to some discussion (for example see Hyatt, 2010). To address this limitation ad-
ditional tests were carried out (available upon request), reducing the difference inmargin
from30% to 20% and 10%. Profit maximization points do not change significantlywhen the
margin contribution for physical books is 30%. Given the assumption of perfect substitut-
ability between formatswe see a significant increment of profitmaximization priceswhen
margin contribution of physical books is 40%. But even in this last case the difference in
discount rates between classic novels and new releases is large and significant, which sup-
ports the arguments made in this article.
Table 3
Average prices and costs of physical (p) and electronic (E) books.
UK USA
PP
New releases £7.99 $12.49
Classic novels £11.49 $17.99
PE
New releases £5.99 $9.99
Classic novels £5.99 $8.99
Profit margin
1− cP 20.26% 20.26%
1− ce 52.50% 52.50%
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The construction of a demand function for eBooks requires a signifi-
cant amount of information for a complexmarket like the publishing in-
dustry. The research therefore includes a number of assumptions to
simplify the problem; whilst the assumptions place significant limits
on the research, the simplifications still give a realistic picture of the
market. To test the rigour of the assumptions thework has been validat-
ed by industry experts. The first assumption refers to the fact that con-
sumers do not purchase the same content in different formats
(Greenstein, 2010). In particular an assumption is made that there are
n consumerswhopurchase a book, selecting the format inwhich to pur-
chase: physical or digital. This decision will depend on the relative
prices of formats. If BP is the number of books sold in physical format
and BE are the books sold in digital format, then Bp+BE=n. In addition,
if Qp ¼ Bp

n is the market share of physical books, and QE ¼ BE

n is the
market share of digital books then Qp+QE=1, or Qp= f(QE)=1−QE.
The second assumption refers to the price of the physical format,
which is assumed to be exogenously given. The rationale behind this as-
sumption is twofold. First, paper books are a mature format and con-
sumers expect certain prices to be applied and the publishers
understand the variables which affect the demand function. Second,
the physical format serves as anchor in the digital format buying deci-
sion. This anchor effect is well-described in the experimental economics
literature (Jones-Lee, 1989), which confirms the appropriateness of the
payment card method as applied here (Camacho-Cuenca et al., 2004;
Ryan & Watson, 2009).
The payment card method involves making an offer available to
the consumer (an eBook in this case) at varied price points from
below to above the anchor price of a comparable offer (in this case
the same book in physical format). The stepwise variations (in eBook
price) are presented sequentially until the consumer switches (or not)
from one offering to the other. The switching point price difference is
then used to determine the respondent's willingness to pay for the
new offer. Points of maximum revenues for markets can be calculated.
Consumers may positively value the offer, such as when the offer is val-
ued at a point higher than the anchor. In this case the digital format of
the book is given a higher value than the physical. In such a case, the in-
direct utility function of a consumer purchasing one unit of the physical
format is:
Up ¼ R−Pp: ð1Þ
Whereas the purchase of a unit of the digital format implies a utility:
UE ¼ RþWi−PE ð2Þ
where R represents the consumer's reservation price, Pp the price of
the physical format, PE the price of the eBook, and Wi consumer i's
specific extra value (positive or negative) that the consumer gives to
the digital format in contraposition to the physical format. A consumerPlease cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.013will prefer the eBook only if UENUp, which implies that the following
holds:
WiNPE−Pp: ð3Þ
Inequality (3) implies that a consumer buys the eBook and not the
paper version only if his/her valuation for the digital format offsets the
price difference across formats.
The implementation of the payment cardfirst requires the collection
of market data. In October 2013 an extensive survey of 4000 consumers
in the UK and 4000 consumers in the USwas conducted in collaboration
with a leading international publisher. The survey included the pay-
ment card questions based on the data collected previously, allowing
the estimation of the switching points. Table 4 gives detailed informa-
tion concerning the switching points. The results show that themajority
of the proportion of the population still prefers to read novels in physi-
cal form. The cheapest price proposed to the respondentswas half of the
market price. For example, in the US a classic novels market price is
$17.99, whilst its digital version is $8.99. Using the payment card the
eBook was offered to US consumers at a discounted price of $4.49, but
even with this large discount 44.1% of the respondents preferred the
paper version, despite the price being four times higher.
With the data collected with the payment card we can directly esti-
mate the demand functions PE=g(QE) and total revenues (TR=
g(QE) ⋅QE)). The form of the function g(⋅) requires further analysis. Anal-
ysis provides 7 switching points (or observations) per eBook category
and country, therefore the degrees of freedom condition the estimation
of g. For that reason estimates aremade only for linear, second and third
degree polynomials. The log likelihood test is performed aftermodel es-
timation and in most of the cases rejects the null hypothesis2 that all
polynomial forms considered have the same information, implying
that third degree functions were the most informative and efficient to
explain the demand form described by the switching points. The ex-
planatory power of those models was high, ranging from R2−0.93 to
R2=0.98.
4.4. Stage 3: the estimation of profit functions for eBooks
The information collected and analysed to this pointwas informative
and sufficient to estimate optimal revenue points; however, the pub-
lisher is a profit maximizing organization and so it is necessary to iden-
tify the profit maximizing price point. The identification of this price
requires the collection of further information to estimate the margin
contribution of digital (1−cE) andphysical (1−cp) formats. Availability
of marginal contribution information is poor as it contributes towards a
publisher's competitive advantage. For the analysis the industry partner
providedfigures for an averagemargin contribution for the sector; spec-
ified at the bottom of Table 3. The margin contribution to profits given
for eBooks is ~50%, and for paper books is ~20%.3tion and supply chain interdependency, Industrial Marketing Manage-
Table 4
Switching points and eBook market share (QE) in the payment card.
UK — new releases USA — new releases
PE QE PE QE
£2.99 0.458 $4.99 0.510
£4.49 0.352 $7.49 0.435
£5.99 0.264 $9.99 0.348
£7.99 0.123 $12.49 0.189
£9.49 0.018 $14.99 0.065
£10.99 0.011 $17.49 0.021
£12.49 0.011 $19.99 0.016
UK — classic novels USA — classic novels
PE QE PE QE
£2.99 0.498 $4.49 0.559
£4.49 0.466 $6.74 0.525
£5.99 0.377 $8.99 0.484
£7.99 0.289 $11.24 0.354
£9.49 0.185 $14.49 0.292
£10.99 0.129 $16.74 0.245
£12.49 0.062 $18.99 0.114
8 F. Vendrell-Herrero et al. / Industrial Marketing Management xxx (2016) xxx–xxxA third assumption performed in this study is that themargin contri-
bution is constant, and does not depend on the country or the type of
novel. With all the data collected and three assumptions mentioned
above, the profit function can be expressed in terms of the market
share of eBooks
π−Pp  1−QEð Þ  1−cp
 þ g QEð Þ  QE  1−cEð Þ ð4Þ
where Pp ,cp and cE are held constant, and g(QE) is a third degree de-
mand function with estimated parameters and switching points. De-
mand and profit functions are drawn in Fig. 3a to d. In these figures
the profit maximizing point determines the market share of eBooks in
the profit function (graph at the bottom of the figure), and the market
share of eBooks determines the price that maximises profits in the de-
mand function (graph at the top of each figure).
4.5. Stage 4: The empirical validation of theoretical propositions
In the fourth and final stage we obtain the results that validate the
theoretical propositions. As can be seen in Table 5 the results support
our two theoretical propositions. For classic novels, where copyright
normally no-longer applies, there are significant discounts offered. In
the UK the profit maximizing price for the eBook is £8.59 and the mar-
ket price £5.99, suggesting that the e-retailer is responsible for a 30%
discount in relation to the profit-maximizing point. Similarly, in the
US the profit maximizing price for the eBook is $14.99 and the market
price $8.99, suggesting that the e-retailer is responsible for
implementing discounts of over 40%. The results show that in the pres-
ence of digital servitization, retailers in the publishing industry enforce
wholesale agreements, enabling them to set amarket price significantly
below the price desired by publishers. E-retailers wish to attract con-
sumers to their websites and increase their sales volume; our results
seem to suggest that e-retailers take advantage of the providers value
offerings where there are no copyrights to increase their consumer
base and revenues through price reductions. Our interpretation of this
result is that the e-retailers action allows them to capture andmaintain
links with a large consumer group, increasing the dependence of the
supplier on the e-retailer for access to the market. This empirically val-
idates theoretical Proposition 1, since the provision of digital services
(eBooks) seems to increase the dependence of upstream firms on
downstream companies.
Our results also demonstrate that publishers have a mechanism to
respond to the power of e-retailers. The inclusion of e-bookswith exclu-
sive copyright allowed publishers to realise e-retailer market pricesPlease cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.013closer to publisher profit maximizing prices. For new releases pub-
lishers are assured a period of exclusive copyright, so we understand
that new releases are a good proxy for the deployment of unique
resource. Our results indicate that for new releases the estimated pub-
lishers' profit maximizing price approximately equals the market
price. This result is consistent in both UK and US markets and suggests
that publishers have regained power in the supply chain when
deploying unique resource. For new releases the enforcement of copy-
rights diminishes the monopsony power of the retailer who cannot de-
crease market prices. Therefore, we take the evidence provided as
empirical validation of theoretical Proposition 2, since the deployment
of unique resources would appear to allow upstream companies to re-
duce relative dependence on downstream companies.
5. Discussion of the results
Publishers are dematerialising their offering by adding digital
services (eBooks) to their existing product offer (books). This makes
the publishing industry an appropriate context to analyse drivers of
servitization such as digitization and firm interdependencies. In addi-
tion, large electronic retailers such as Amazon control the link channel
to the final customer and have shifted the balance of power in the sup-
ply chain (Ritala et al., 2014). The analysis of the specific context is gen-
erating a body of managerial and economic literature to which we also
contribute, as one of the main issues “involves the conflict between
Amazon and publishers, and in particular their preference for different
industry pricing models” (Gilbert, 2015, p. 165).
At the time of writing the articles published on pricing strategies of
publishers and retailers are found to be complementary since they use
different methodological approaches to reach a similar conclusion. In
empirical terms, De los Santos and Wildenbeest (2015) perform an
event study and find that after a wholesale model empowering retailers
was implemented in 2012 in theUSmarket prices decreased on average
by 18%. Reimers and Waldfogel (2014) use market data to translate
hourly price changes into an estimation of price elasticity of demand
for eBooks. Their result suggests that eBooks are priced below the static
profit maximizing level. Our empirical approach uses consumer survey
data and a payment card to elicit demand functions. The results show
that in conditions where the publisher does not have unicity of an
offer, eBooks are priced 30–40% below the profit maximizing level.
Three studies with different methodological strategies (i.e. event
study, demand elicitation/market data, demand elicitation/survey
data) identify a similar result which strengthens the relevance of
Proposition 1, which states that the addition of digital services in prod-
uctfirms increases the relative dependence of upstreamfirms (i.e. profit
maximizing publishers) on downstream companies (i.e. revenue maxi-
mizing retailers).
To the best of our knowledge previous research has not identified a
way publishers can influence retailer's price positioning of their offer-
ings. So far publishers' efforts have been focused on implementing
“windowing”, “disintermediation” or “agency pricing” strategies, but
none of them appear to have an influence on the way retailers operate
(Gilbert, 2015). However, we argue that there is a missing element in
the toolkit of publishers, the deployment of immutable resource, se-
cured in this case by the publisher holding copyright over work.
In a recent study Heald (2014) constructed a random sample of
books for sale on Amazon.com and identified that there were more
books for sale from the 1880s than the 1980s. Her result suggests that
copyright status is negatively associated with books availability on Am-
azon. Building on this evidence our second proposition states that
unique resources (i.e. copyright) allow upstream companies to reduce
their dependence on downstream companies. Our results fully support
this evidence. When publishers do not have exclusive copyright over a
digital title the market price offered by the e-retailer is 30–40% below
the publisher's profit maximizing price. However, when publishers
have exclusive copyrights over the digital title market price offered bytion and supply chain interdependency, Industrial Marketing Manage-
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Table 5
Market price and publishers' profit maximizing point for eBooks.
Market price Profit maximizing point Discount
UK New releases £ 5.99 £ 6.08 1.48%
Classic novels £ 5.99 £ 8.59 30.27%
US New releases $ 9.99 $ 9.93 −0.60%
Classic novels $ 8.99 $ 14.99 40.03%
10 F. Vendrell-Herrero et al. / Industrial Marketing Management xxx (2016) xxx–xxxthe e-retailer is practically the same as thatwhichmaximises profit. Our
evidence seems to indicate that copyrighted books allow publishers to
circumvent the otherwise dominant position of the e-retailers. This
finding supports other research which demonstrates how unique re-
sources can improve firm positioning and value capture processes in
the supply chain (Costa et al., 2013; Finne et al., 2015; Keil et al., 2010;
Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Ulaga & Reinhart, 2011).
The provision of digital services requires the combination of cloud
content (i.e. data, applications, eBooks), a physical productwith embed-
ded hardware and software and a link channel to deliver the service to
the customer, usually a retailer (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014, p. 7). A
strategic element of power in publishing supply chains is the control
of the digital book reading devices, which is currently in the hands of re-
tailers (i.e. Amazon's Kindle). A recent game-theoretical approach is
consistent with this possibility. The work of Gaudin & White (2014)
finds that if the retailer did not exclusively own the reading device,
the equilibrium price point of eBooks in the wholesale agreement
would be greater than it is under agency agreements.
The analysis in this paper focuses primarily on the pricing strategies
of publishers and retailers. The assumption that price determination is
the main element of rivalry between publishers and retailers is central
to the literature in this area (De los Santos & Wildenbeest, 2015;
Gaudin & White, 2014; Gilbert, 2015; Hua et al., 2011; Li et al., 2015;
Reimers & Waldfogel, 2014), however we acknowledge that there are
other factors such as specific investments or high exit costs that might
explain the power relationship between publishers and retailers. Our
data does not contain information to examine those factors sufficiently
to comment on their impact and recent literature is silent on these is-
sues as well. Further research is required to examine the role of specific
investments and exit costs that can influence power in the publishing
industry supply chain.
6. Conclusion
6.1. Academic implications
The literature on servitization was initiated with the seminal article
of Vandermerwe and Rada (1988) andwhilst their work discusses both
goods and servicefirms servitization research has focusedmainly on the
move to implement services undertaken by manufacturing companies.
The theoretical concepts of servitization have been applied in the
study of digital technologies in software (Suarez et al., 2013) and
music industries (Parry et al., 2012) and this sub-stream of research is
named digital servitization (Lerch & Gotsch, 2015; Schroeder &
Kotlarsky, 2015; Vendrell-Herrero & Wilson, 2016). This article is
novel as it is explicitly positioned to examine digital servitization and
the interdependencies of firms in supply chains. The choice of the digital
transition of the publishing industry is relevant because it simulta-
neously involves the provision of digital services and the appearance
of powerful electronic retailers (Gilbert, 2015), elements that have
transformed the way firms in many industries compete (Porter &
Heppelmann, 2014).
Our empirical analysis has three important insights that contribute
towards the understanding of industry dynamics after digital
servitization. First, our results confirm that digital servitization has
transformed the structure of the supply chain, separating the infrastruc-
ture operation and service provision from production (Stabell &Please cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.013Fjeldstad, 1998) and impacting on the power of firms in vertical rela-
tionships (Cox, 1999; Scheer et al., 2014). Second, the methodological
approach presented here is novel and offers an enhanced view of
consumer surplus and worth value (Lepak et al., 2007) in digital
servitization though the use of the payment card method (Ryan &
Watson, 2009). Third, our evidence shows that provision of digital ser-
vices produces a paradigm shift in consumer valuation (Anand et al.,
2009; Rifkin, 2014).
In relation to supply chain structure, previous empirical research has
analysed digital servitization from a unidirectional approach (e.g.
Opresnik & Taisk, 2015; Parry et al., 2012), focusing on either a down-
streamor upstream firm perspective. This article provides a bidirection-
al perspective, analysing the power dynamics of the interdependencies
between upstream and downstream parties. The evidence in the pres-
ent research supports two theoretical propositions which state that
(1) digital servitization empowers downstream firms when they gain
control of link channels to consumers (Bustinza et al., 2013; Wise &
Baumgartner, 1999), but (2) upstream companies can regain power
when they control key resources which are desirable to the consumer
(Costa et al., 2013; Finne et al., 2015; Ulaga & Reinhart, 2011). As such,
thefindings demonstrate that digital servitization produces asymmetric
interdependencies that empower downstream companies when re-
sources are not immutable. In the case where a provider holds immuta-
ble resource upstream companies are able to alter power
interdependences in their favour. This is a significant contribution for
the particular case of the publishing industry, as previous research
was unable to identify an effective mechanism for publishers to rebal-
ance the power in their dependent relationship with retailers (Gilbert,
2015).
The dynamics of power imbalance provides a further contribution to
mainstream servitization and digital servitization literatures. These
literatures are underpinned by the assumption that companies
implementing servitization strategies go downstream, enhancing
value creation at the cost of lowering value network dominance,
which could harm their value capturing processes (Kowalkowski et al.,
2015). This is one of the main reasons why servitization is considered
a risky strategy and some companies have decided to de-servitize in
order to survive (Benedetti et al., 2015). Nevertheless, our evidence sug-
gests that having a dominant position in the supply chain and moving
downstream through the supply chain are not necessarily related
events.We argue that one important condition for product firms to suc-
cessfully implement service business models is to lock in their compet-
itive advantage by assuring they have control over the difficult to
imitate elements of their offerings. These results are consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical model of Lee, Staelin, Yoo, and Du
(2013) who find that differentiation is a crucial factor to determine up-
stream profitability.
6.2. Managerial implications
The provision of digital and smart products has transformed theway
firms compete and provide services (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014,
2015). Digital servitization has implications for the relational power a
firm holds in the supply chain as the transition to service often em-
powers downstream companies (Bustinza et al., 2013; Wise &
Baumgartner, 1999). In the case of the publishing industry Amazon il-
lustrates this dominance having achieved 60% of the global market
share in eBooks and exponential growth in both revenues and share
price over the last decade. The past success of this company is linked
to volume maximizing behaviour and seeking to reduce market prices
(Baye et al., 2013; Gilbert, 2015). Digital servitization has produced a
more complex situation for creative content producers upstream in
the supply chain who have often experienced decreasing or stagnating
revenues (Myrthianos et al., 2014).
To counteract the loss of power and reduction in revenue produced
by the entry of retailers controlling linking channels, product firms havetion and supply chain interdependency, Industrial Marketing Manage-
11F. Vendrell-Herrero et al. / Industrial Marketing Management xxx (2016) xxx–xxxapplied a number of different strategies including windowing (Gilbert,
2015), different contractual agreements (Baye et al., 2013), disinterme-
diation (Porter & Heppelman, 2014), and deployment of unique re-
sources (Costa et al., 2013). The analysis here is context specific and
focuses on publishing firms. Previous research in the book publishing
industry has shown that agency contracts, windowing and disinterme-
diation are not suitable strategies to maintain a sustainable position of
power (Gilbert, 2015). In this work we show that holding immutable
resource has an effect on the way publishers and retailers interact. Pub-
lishers have power in their relationshipwith retailers over new releases
where they hold copyright, creating an immutable resource, but not
with regards older publicationswhere no copyright exists. Consequent-
ly, publishers need to focus on marketing unique resources for profit
maximization and look at collaborative commodity strategies (i.e. vol-
ume) with retailers for out of copyright titles. A willingness to develop
volume strategies for older titles may facilitate the development of co-
operative strategies with digital retailers. Cooperation could be used to
gain access to consumer transaction data (Bell, 2015), which would
allow providers to better estimate demand functions and comprehend
the interests and purchasing patterns of consumers.
Future dominance in the supply chain is not guaranteed and
Amazon, aswell as other digital retailers, will need to adopt cooperative
approaches in the future (Ritala et al., 2014), and to assure that their
dominant role in the industry provides more benefits than costs for up-
stream companies. The leading trade magazine Bookseller's editor
Philip Jones notes “The worst thing that could happen [to book publishers]
would be for Amazon to go away”,4 but at the same time “The second
worst thing would be for it to become more dominant”.6.3. Limitations and future research avenues
This article contributes to industrial marketing with an empirical
methodological grounding based in microeconomics. This article pro-
vides a novel analysis of upstream–downstream bilateral relationships
in servitization literature, which is also consistent with theoretical mi-
croeconomic techniques such as game theoretic models. Whilst game
theoretic modelling is beyond the scope of this paper we acknowledge
relevant research (e.g. Yoo & Lee, 2011) and our investigation provides
opportunities for alternative research approaches, for example with
regards the differences in business goals. Future game theoretic models
may show how a dominant and revenue-maximizing firm affects the
strategic decisions of other companies as well as the specific relevance
of sources of competitive advantage such as the upstream–downstream
knowledge asymmetries created by demand for new varieties.
Methodological assumptions in the construction of demand func-
tions include perfect substitutability of physical and digital formats
and their polynomial form. Such assumptions place limits upon the ve-
racity of thework and futurework could explore howdemand functions
differ using other assumptions and methods. In addition, demand func-
tions estimated with survey data may suffer from hypothetical bias.
Work should be undertaken to correct for this potential bias, eliciting
demand functions in the laboratory (Camacho-Cuenca et al., 2004). Fi-
nally, profit functions were difficult to estimate since confidentiality
clauses impeded access to data of publishers' cost functions and their
marginal contributions, particularly the differences between cost and
profit for physical and eBooks. Future research, including more precise
information on the cost functions of publishers and intermediaries,
will enhance the understanding of pricing strategies for physical and
digital offerings.
We acknowledge that we make a strong assumption with regards
the underlying strategy of Amazon. Our assumption that Amazon's
strategy is that of a revenue maximizer is based on the observed data
for the period of study and supported by the firm's market share price.4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27994314. Last accessed 30th June 2014.
Please cite this article as: Vendrell-Herrero, F., et al., Servitization, digitiza
ment (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.06.013However, ‘timemakes fools of us all’ and in future greater data availabil-
ity may challenge our assumption. In addition, according to Ritala et al.
(2014) and Bell (2015) Amazon's core strategy is to create value though
capturing data from consumers andmaking informed decisions on how
to distribute and store products. This does not rule out the possibility
that Amazon behaves as a revenue maximizing firm. Indeed, we con-
tend that it is difficult to derive a convincing alternative conclusion
fromFig. 2, where it is shown that the companyhas not reported a profit
for fourteen years, whereas revenues have increased exponentially.
Whilst the present research uses the publishing industry as themain
context of analysis,we expect that the theoretical andmanagerial impli-
cations of the present research can be instructive and provide guidance
to others contexts. Future research should focus upon additional specific
contexts. A recent example is the taxi industry where upstream firms
represented by associations of licensed taxis have lost their dominant
market position with the arrival of Uber in the downstream, who have
developed an effective digital link channel to the consumer.
Another avenue of further inquiry is to identify patterns of power
dynamics after digital disruption and assess whether alternative strate-
gies for securing the competitive advantage of product firms, such as
new contractual agreements, windowing or disintermediation, are ef-
fective in other contexts.
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